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May 25th, 2007 10:00

Vulnerability Note VU#606857

Hello,

We have been told from our security group that we have the following volnerability on our Legatto Networker (ver7.2) - where do I get the patches?



Vulnerability Note VU#606857
EMC Legato NetWorker uses weak AUTH_UNIX authentication
Overview
EMC Legato NetWorker uses weak AUTH_UNIX authentication, allowing a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, gain elevated privileges, or cause a denial of service.
I. Description
EMC Legato NetWorker is a cross-platform backup and recovery application. It is also repackaged by Sun Microsystems as Solstice Backup and StorEdge Enterprise Backup, by FSC as Fujitsu Siemens Computers' NetWorker, by NEC as WebSAM NetWorker Powered by Legato, and by Fujitsu as NetWorker.
NetWorker authentication

NetWorker uses the AUTH_UNIX authentication mechanism (a client-based security option) for its RPC service. This means the NetWorker software trusts that the remote system calling its RPC interface has already authenticated the remote client process via standard UNIX user id mechanisms (i.e., if a daemon only allows UID 0 [root] access to its RPC interface, it trusts remote RPC clients to be running with UID 0 [root] privileges).

NetWorker components

nwadmin and nsradmin are the administrative utilities for NetWorker. They can be used to view or modify the configuration of a NetWorker server. The NetWorker server grants administrative access based on an administrators list. nwadmin and nsradmin use getpwuid_r(getuid()) to determine the invoking user's name.

nsrports is used to specify the port ranges used by the NetWorker software. nsrports allows any user with an apparent username of "root" to set NetWorker port ranges.

The recover program is used to restore files that were backed up using the NetWorker software. recover determines what files may be accessed based on the UID of the user that calls the process.

nsrexec and nsrexecd are NetWorker components that provide functionality similar to rsh. nsrexec is a command that runs on the NetWorker server to send commands to the client systems. nsrexecd is a service that runs on the NetWorker client systems. nsrexecd executes commands on the client system that it receives from the NetWorker server. The combination of nsrexec and nsrexecd is what allows the NetWorker server to execute commands on the client remotely, such as initiating a backup process. The nsrexecd service uses RPC AUTH_UNIX to determine the identity of the user who will run the backup command.

The problem

The authentication mechanisms used by the various NetWorker components are weak. AUTH_UNIX authentication does not provide sufficient protection against attacks because it relies solely on the authentication credentials provided by the client. An attacker can spoof the user name to bypass the authentication mechanism used by nwadmin, nsradmin, and nsrports. An attacker can spoof the UID to bypass the authentication mechanism used by recover and nsrexecd.

II. Impact
A remote unauthenticated attacker may take any of the following actions:
Execute arbitrary commands on a NetWorker client system
View or modify the configuration of the NetWorker server
Cause a denial-of-service condition by altering the ports used by NetWorker
View files backed up by any other NetWorker client, regardless of file permissions
A local user may be able to gain elevated privileges on a system running NetWorker.
III. Solution
Apply a patch or upgrade
Apply a patch or upgrade, as specified in the EMC Legato Technical Product Alert.

Sun Solstice Backup and StorEdge Enterprise Backup customers should see Sun Alert 101866 for patch availability.

Restrict access

You may wish to block access to the vulnerable software from outside your network perimeter, specifically by blocking access to the ports used by NetWorker (typically TCP and UDP ports 7937-9936). This will limit your exposure to attacks. However, blocking at the network perimeter would still allow attackers within the perimeter of your network to exploit the vulnerability. The use of host-based firewalls in addition to network-based firewalls can help restrict access to specific hosts within the network. It is important to understand your network's configuration and service requirements before deciding what changes are appropriate.

Systems Affected
Vendor Status Date Updated
EMC Software Vulnerable 16-Aug-2005
Fujitsu Limited Vulnerable 24-Aug-2005
NEC Vulnerable 24-Aug-2005
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Vulnerable 19-Sep-2005

References

http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/product_alerts/081605_NW-7x.htm
http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/product_alerts/081605_NW_authentication.htm
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-101886-1
http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/tech_bulletins/?includefile=388.html
http://www.legato.com/products/networker/
http://secunia.com/advisories/16464/
http://secunia.com/advisories/16470/
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/07/25/hackers.backup.software.reut/index.html

Credit
Thanks to the NOAA NCIRT Lab for reporting this vulnerability

6 Operator

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May 26th, 2007 11:00

Document you reference has note where to get patches itself. 7.2 is really old and buggy version (initial build) so if you really have that one you probably have other things to worry rather than mentioned one. I would suggest to move to 7.2.2 latest build level (which is I believe 499).

1 Rookie

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87 Posts

June 12th, 2007 07:00

Hi

I just used Nessus to test NetWorker for Linux V7.3.2 Jumbo 1. This NW version still has the Nessus-detected vulnerability: "Arbitrary code can be executed on the remote host". The first two links in the base posting of this thread are no longer viable. Is there a patch for this problem?

Thanks!
tl

6 Operator

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June 12th, 2007 10:00

What is Nessus?

1 Rookie

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87 Posts

June 12th, 2007 11:00

"Nessus is the world's most popular vulnerability scanner used in over 75,000 organizations world-wide" [http://www.nessus.org/about]

6 Operator

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June 12th, 2007 14:00

Might be that issue is masked or misinterpreted by Nessus. By the book, it should be fixed by current code. As EMC person you can easily check that. If regression exists you should check if that one was reported so far. It would interesting to see what exactly Nessus does to determine if this issue is present or not.

1 Rookie

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87 Posts

June 25th, 2007 10:00

I used Nessus 3.0.5 on systems with NetWorker V7.3.2 Jumbo patch 1 (build 386), and found that the 7938/tcp vulnerability exists on Solaris 10, SLES 10 SP1 x86, SLES 9 SP3 x86, and RHEL 4 U5 x86. But it does not exist on Windows 2003 SP2.

tl

1 Rookie

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87 Posts

June 25th, 2007 11:00

I don't know how, and may not have the necessary access!

6 Operator

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June 25th, 2007 11:00

Strange to see that it exists on Solaris and not on Windows :D Have you checked internal db for it and its current status?

6 Operator

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June 25th, 2007 13:00

You will probably need to talk to someone from engineering group (even I still suspect that what has been reported is not correct). Also, in email directory you should be able to find group alias and perhaps ask them that way. Try to make a test with latest build too.
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